Commitment Markets

What can be financed depends on who will commit, on what terms and for how long. We study how those commitments shape investment, and what changes when AI agents help organize them.

Current publications

Working paper
John Komkov
October 2026

The Formation Game

Investors can share an investment without holding identical portfolios. The paper shows how compatible capital and commitment timing affect formation. In its allocation models, retaining a veto can require growing replacement capacity when favored projects are private. Externally verifiable favored projects permit a different result: bounded expected payments can preserve the veto without withdrawals under the specified assumptions. Shared records can also reduce incentive costs.

AI methods report
John Komkov
5 October 2026

Separate Records, Shared Processing

A paired experiment processes the same synthetic investment histories separately and together, with and without persistent records and validation. Records reduce repeated retrieval. Shared processing has lower recorded inference costs, while the tested improvement saves more in separate processing. Successful primary contexts are at the scored interpretation ceiling, and most exact-output improvement is a change in how abstention is represented. The report preserves failures, costs, prompts and receipts. It measures a component of processing cost, not investment returns or the total value of an investment office.

Foundations

Foundations
John Komkov
8 October 2026

What belongs in a fund?

Capital, discretion, exposure and records can serve different purposes. An introduction to the research.

Essay
Argosy Research
8 October 2026

Your portfolio is the brief.

How holdings, obligations and cash needs direct the search for an investment.

Research directions

The publications above establish results in specified models and experiments. The following directions connect that work to questions still under investigation.

Polycentric Finance

How independent mandates support shared investment, and when collective search makes new opportunities feasible.

The Formation Game studies compatible capital, commitment timing and information. Search over opportunities and supplier terms remains a further question.

The Formation Game

Commitments and capacity

How overlapping obligations affect available capacity, and what it costs to stand ready.

Further work concerns shared backing, coincident calls and the pricing of commitments. These questions extend beyond the published results.

Agents and institutions

How delegated authority, verification and coordination change when decisions become faster and cheaper.

Separate Records, Shared Processing measures a bounded document-processing task. Wider questions about accountable action and institutions remain open.

Separate Records, Shared Processing

Research archive

Earlier publications and supporting material